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Abstract. There is an increasing trend among investors to consider Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in determining
company incentives are to be invested in. Obviously, investors would prefer to make investments in companies that adopt Good
Corporate Governance rather than otherwise. This view has eventually led to a belief that GCG can give added values not only
to the adopting company, but also to the stakeholders. This research analyzes the impacts of family ownership and founding
CEO/chairperson on a company’s costs of debt. This topic is chosen in consideration that there are still a lot of family-owned
companies in Indonesia. The research uses a positivist-quantitative paradigm and the samples are 64 family-owned companies
listed at the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2009. The research also uses a random effect model. The results of the
research indicate that family ownership has positive but insignificant impacts, while founding CEO/chairperson has no impacts
on a company’s costs of debt.
Keywords: corporate governance, family ownership, cost of debt

INTRODUCTION
According to the National Committee on Governance
(KNKG), good corporate governance (GCG) is a pillar
of the market economic system. Corporate governance
is closely associated with a good trust in the adopting
companies as well as in the business climate in a country.
Adoption of GCG can create a healthy competition
encouraging business climate. Therefore, in order to drive
sustainable economic growth and stability, it is important
for Indonesian companies to adopt CGC (KNKG, 2006).
Meanwhile, according to OECD (Sutojo and Aldridge,
2008), corporate governance is
“the system by which business corporations are
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities
among different participants in the corporation, such as the
board, the managers, shareholders and other stakeholders,
and spells out the rules and procedure for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides
the structure through which the company objectives are set,
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance”.
Good corporate governance is expected to (1) improve
company’s performance through better decision-making
processes, better operational efficiency and better services
to stakeholders; (2) provide wider access to cheaper
funding in order to improve corporate value; (3) regain
investors’ trust to invest their capital in Indonesia; (4) give
shareholders better satisfaction through improved corpo-

rate performance, shareholders’ values and dividends;
(5) to minimize differences and frictions in the internal
management, which can be achieved if a company can
ensure that GCG is adopted in all its business aspects and
lines (FCGI, 2006).
According to Solomon (2007), the most important
aspect in corporate governance is ownership structure.
There are several ownership structures, for example,
insider, institution, government, and family ownership.
Family ownership is of particular interest in Indonesia,
where a lot of companies are owned by family members.
A number of studies related to family ownership have
been conducted, namely, among others, De Clerck and
Crijns (1997), Wiwattanakantang, (2000), Claessens
et al., (2000), Arifin (2003) and Ayub (2008). Family
ownership is also often referred to as highly-concentrated ownership. A family-owned company will have
better efficiency in cost monitoring due to minimized
conflict of agency between principal and agent. (Fama
and Jensen, 1983). Mishra et al., (2001), Yammeesri and
Lodh (2001) and Anderson et al. (2003) find that familycontrolled companies have better performances. The
reason for this is that family ownership entails a stronger
authority to monitor the operations of the company; that
it has a bigger concern for the company’s performance.
In general, Wiwattanakantang (2000) classifies familyowned companies into: (a) Single-family-owned firms,
(b) Non single-family-owned firms, (c) Conglomeratefirms, and (d) Non-conglomerate companies.
Ownership structure affects not only a company’s
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performance, but also its costs of debt. These impacts
are related to the encumbering of debts by a creditor to a
company or shareholders, which is also known as a form
of asset substitution. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain
that problems between shareholders and a creditor may arise
from the transfer of investment risks from shareholders to the
creditor. Such problems are related to the investment in a
project with risks that are higher than those of the other
existing projects. As a result, the creditor compensates
the risk by imposing higher costs of debt. Publicly listed
companies are identical with separation between ownership and managerial functions, which can potentially give
rise to conflicts and costs among shareholders, managers,
and creditors. Companies with concentrated shareholders
are more likely to incur higher agency costs, of which
forms may vary from reduced returns for minority shareholders, over-avoidance of risks, to higher costs of debt
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
A family-owned company is a company with concentrated shareholders. However, when a family-owned
company is managed by a founding CEO/chairperson who
is still a member of the owning family, conflicts among the
shareholders, managers, and creditor can be minimized.
The reason for this is that the owning family can monitor
the company better because its members act not only as
shareholders but as people who manage the company
(Casson, 1999). In addition, due to a stronger sense of
belonging among the founding family members, a familyowned company tends to have a better performance than
that managed by an external party (Villangola and Amit,
2004).
Creditor-shareholders conflicts can also greatly be
reduced because the shareholders belong to the founding
family and they are the type of investors who have longterm orientation and consider the possible risks in every
investment they make. They are the kind of investors who
also want to bequeath the company they currently run to
the next generation, which is the very reason that they
are usually greatly concerned about the continuity of their
company. In this case, the costs of debt encumbered by
the creditor to the company tend to be lower. The costs of
debt that the creditor imposes on the company will also
be lower if the company has a good record of governance.
Creditors like banks and other financing institutions that
often deal with the managing family members would
consider that any investments made by the family would
give such maximum levels of returns as would reduce
their risks as creditors (Anderson et al., 2003).
Apart from family-owned companies that are managed
by the founding family members, there are also familyowned companies that are run by descendants of the
founding family members. Usually the CEOs of such
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companies are descendents of the founding family
members. Based on previous researches by Johnson et
al. (1985), Morck et al. (1988), and Villangola and Amit
(2006), a CEO who is a descendant of the founding family
would likely inherit the company’s working culture and
values. This tendency may be caused by the fact that the
CEO position is achieved by means of familial ties rather
than hard work, experience and skills. If the company
does not have a good performance, creditors will be faced
with greater risks. Therefore, they would impose higher
costs of debt to the company as a compensation of the
higher risks they have to bear (Anderson et al., 2003).
Performance is also a factor that determines the level
of costs of debt a creditor imposes to a company. Thus,
CEO is a factor that is crucially related to a company’s
performance. A CEO that comes from a company-owning
family and happens to be a hard worker who possesses the
necessary professional skills, experiences can improve
the company’s performance and thus reduce the costs of
debt it has to incur (Anderson et al., 2003).
Furthermore, for their finance family-owned companies would rather seek debt-based funding than publish
new shares (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is because
owning families do not want to lose power and authority
over their companies. Previous researches find that
family-owned companies tend to incur lower costs of
debt because their investments are long-term-oriented
and undiversified (Anderson et al., 2003).
Basically, researches on impacts of family ownership structure refer to similar definitions family-owned
company. That is, they all consider certain percentages
of ownership and degrees of family representation. The
difference generally lies in the amount of cut-off ownership percentage used. This research uses La Porta’s criteria
of family ownership La Porta (1999), which exclude
financing companies, but the minimum percentage of
family ownership for research is 5%, considering that
according to the regulation, ownership of 5% or more of a
company’s shares must be reported to the Indonesia stock
exchange. Thus, with all the data available, it is easier to
group companies with family ownership and non-family
ownership structures.
Based on Wiwattanakantang (2000), in developing
countries, most companies are controlled by individuals,
their family members and their partners. This trend is also
common in Indonesia as a developing country. Initially
these companies were mostly closed companies, whose
businesses are funded internally with supports from
external loans. However, along with economic and capital
market development, many of such family-owned companies later turned into open companies. Once they have
become open companies, the risks and profits that used
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to be shared by the entire owning family, now must be
shared with external parties. When a company becomes
an open company, it not only shares risks with an external
party, but it can also have a wider access to funds for
its business expansion (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). A
research on family ownership in Indonesia has been
conducted by Ayub (2008), who, by using cross-sectional
regression, studied the costs of debt of 65 family-owned
companies that were registered at the Indonesia stock
exchange in 2007. The results indicate that the proportion
of family ownership and founding CEO has no impact on
the amount of costs of debt. Unlike in Ayub’s research,
however, the data in this research are tested by means of
panel data.
Previous literature such as Morck et al. (1988) and
McConnell and Servaes (1990) state that as a company’s managerial capability improves, the interests of
the management and shareholders become more interconnected, causing company performance to also improve.
However, when a company’s stock equity keeps on
increasing, the management’s interests may deviate away
from those of the shareholders. This may cause bigger
problems and reduce the company’s performance. In
addition, a minority group of shareholders who are not
directly affiliated in a company can pose an impact on
management-shareholders conflicts as they have strong
incentives to monitor the management.
Family-owned companies have a number of characteristics
that affect the determination of their capital structure
and investment behavior. Compared to more diversified
non-family-owned companies, family-owned companies
are rarely well diversified. Ownership is concentrated on a
certain group of people (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990).
In other words, family-based ownership usually has a
longer orientation as owning families want to hand down
the companies to the next generation. Furthermore, still in
relation to long-term ownership orientation, family-owned
companies tend to make low-risk investments in low-risk
projects. (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999).
Another general characteristic of family-owned
companies is that in financing their businesses they would
rather seek debts than publish new shares (Anderson et
al., 2003). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue
that in terms of business financing, companies with
family ownership structure generally prefer to incur debts
rather than publish new shares. There are a number of
reasons for such a preference. First, being members of
the founding family, major shareholders have long-term
investments that would last for more than a generation.
Therefore, they are rather oriented to long-term management pursuits and business continuity, which are main
company goals. Thus, for them, longer-term funding
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schemes seem to be a better choice than issuing new
shares, which has short-term orientation (James, 1999).
Second, the above characteristic results from a concern
that publishing new shares would not only reduce the
percentage of family ownership, but also weaken their
voice and authority in controlling the company. In other
words, losing power and authority over their company
would be their last option (Anderson et al., 2003).
The basic assumption that leads a family-owned
company to prioritize internal funding over external
funding is that a family-owned company has a long-term
goal to develop external funding (the trade-off theory),
but initially, it apparently avoids external funding in effort
to form a tax shield against the debts the company incurs
for its business (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chen et
al., 2008). When internal funding (retained earnings) is
impossible, companies would rather seek external funding
by issuing debts than issuing new shares (equity). Another
assumption is that there may be some kind of asymmetrical
information circulating in the company, which, induces
owning family members to prioritize family gains (i.e.
cost minimization) for the initial funding, but at the
same time give rise to family costs that result from the
growing scope of diversifications during the course of
the company’s development (Yupitun, 2009). From the
above assumptions, it can be understood that although
the family-owned companies referred to in this research
prefer debt-based funding, they still also seek external
funding to allow capital diversification in their development.
Furthermore, there will always be a cost of debt arising
from every debt a company owes. Costs of debt are used
to break down the risks promised in the expected standard.
Costs of debt are also used as a component in the repayment of the principal (Cooper and Davydenko, 2001).
High costs of debt can result from the different interests
between shareholders and creditors. By investing in highrisk projects, diversified shareholders pose high risks to
creditors, but there is also a promise of high return. Therefore, creditors compensate this by imposing high costs of
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Meanwhile, in some familyowned companies whose shareholders are undiversified,
the risks of investments are smaller for creditors because
owning family members prefer investments that give them
smaller risks.
However, family-owned companies with concentrated
share ownership tend to have lower levels of performances because they place many incompetent family
members in the management, which consequently causes
costs of debt to increase (Anderson et al., 2003). Another
factor that determines a company’s performance and costs
of debt is its CEO. It is commonly believed that when the
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CEO of a company is also its founder, costs of debt will
be lower as the company is likely to have a higher level
of performance (Anderson et al., 2003). The costs of debt
that a creditor imposes also depend on the performance
of the company in debt. Therefore, the fact that CEOs
have significant impacts on company performance makes
them a crucial factor. A CEO who is both a member of
the owning family and a hard-working and experienced
professional has the capability to improve company
performance, which consequently ensures smaller costs
of debt (Anderson et al., 2003).
Based on the background above, this research aims to
analyze (1) the extent to which family ownership affects
a company’s costs of debt; and (2) the extent to which
the costs of debt of a company are affected by family
members who are both its founders and owners. The
research will hopefully confirm and enrich the results of
the previous researches on the impacts of family ownership and founding and owning family members on costs
of debt.
RESEARCH METHODS
This study uses a positivist paradigm with a quantitative approach. Samples are chosen by means of judgment/
purposes sampling method. That is, samples are chosen
by considering a set of criteria set by the writer. In other
words, elements are included as samples intentionally in
order to fulfill the above criteria, provided that the samples
adequately represent the population. (Supranto, 2003).
The sample criteria are as follows. (1) Sample companies
(423 companies) should be listed at the Indonesia stock
exchange during the period between 2007 and 2009; (2)
Sample companies operate in non-financing businesses—
that is, they must not be banks, or insurance, leasing, and
security companies, for problems could possibly arise
in the calculation and comparison between the research
control variables and non-financial companies (Ikhwan,
2009). Consequently, the samples are then reduced to 353
companies. (3) Sample companies must have a minimum
family ownership percentage of 5%. With this criterion in
mind, there number of samples is now reduced to 67. (4)
Sample companies must have a complete set of financial
report data for the period studied (2001-2009). Despite
this additional criterion, the number of samples still
remains. (5) The financial reports of the sample companies have earlier been audited by the Bapepam (Capital
Market Supervisory Agency) and should be obtained from
the Bloomberg special Historical Widget for Bapepam.
Finally, there are now 64 sample companies.
The variables in this research include family ownership (FAMOWN) and founding CEO (CEO) as inde-
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pendent variables and Cost of debt (COD) as a dependent variable. The controlling variables are level of debt
(LEV), company size (SIZE), and company performance
(PERF). This research examines two hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is, as Villalonga and Amit (2004) and Ayub
(2008) claim, that family ownership correlates positively
with a company’s costs of debt. This is because creditors
would not likely consider proportion of family ownership
in charging costs of debt to a family-owned company.
Proportion of family ownership neither signifies company
risks nor affects the creditor in deciding the amount of
costs of debt to be charged to a company.
Hypothesis 1
H0 : Family ownership does not affect costs of debt.
H1 : Family ownership affects costs of debt.
Second, Ayub (2008) claims that a founding CEO or
Chairperson does not affect costs of debt. Responsible
for the company’s operations, a CEO or chairman is not
the main factor that determines the success of a company
because in his/her duty, he/she must be supported by
other people who possess good individual competence
and performance to improve the company’s performance. Creditors generally do not regard the existence
of a company-founding CEO or chairperson as a factor
that can reduce the risks they face. The fact that the CEO/
chairperson also happens to be a founder of the company
is not regarded in the calculation of the costs of debt the
company must bear.
Hypothesis 2
H0 : Leadership of a family-owned company by a
founding CEO affects costs of debt.
H1 : Leadership of a family-owned company by a
founding CEO does not affect costs of debt.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable,
which include average, maximum and minimum, and
standard deviation values.
The average cost of debt in family-owned companies
is 0.0751. Based on this average cost of debt value, it is
apparent that the costs of debt that creditors impose on
companies are in general not high because the value is
just a little above the SBI (Bank Indonesia Certificates)
interest rate, which is 6.5% in 2009 and below the 2007
and 2008 SBI interest rate, which is 9.5%. The mean
proportion of family ownership (FAMOWN) in Indonesian
companies is 0.5108 and the maximum value is 0.9900. The
large proportion of family ownership above indicates that
family-owned companies in Indonesia are dominated by
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Research Samples
COD

CEO

FAMOWN

LEV

SIZE

PERF

Mean

0.0751

0.50

0.5108

0.3593

13.3583

0.0183

Median

0.0702

0.50

0.5500

0.3466

13.4856

0.0229

Maximum

0.1882

1.00

0.9900

2.5252

17.7626

0.2722

Minimum

0

0

0.0900

0

8.7499

-0.6673

Std. Dev.

0.0420

0.5013

0.2325

0.3162

1.7963

0.0768

Observations

192

192

192

192

192

192

Cross sections

64

64

64

64

64

64

Table 2. Hypothesis 1 Test Results
Independent Variable

COD Dependent Variable
Coefficient

t-statistic

Probability

FAMOWN

0.0206

4.9757

0.0000

LEV

0.0325

4.8120

0.0000

SIZE

0.0080

3.0925

0.0023

PERF

-0.0926

-4.4825

0.0000

Intercept

-0.0529

-1.8248

0.0696

Overall R-Square

0.1915

Adjusted R-Square

0.1742

Durbin-Watson stat

2.1678

family shareholders. The average value of founding CEO
or chairperson is 0.50. Because it is a dummy variable,
the value is binary, 1 or 0. Thus, the value 0.5 indicates
that half of the family-owned companies in Indonesia
studied between 2007 and 2009 are still run or monitored
directly by their founders. The value 0 for Leverage indicates that there are 6 companies that do not have standing
debts. This finding is consistent with the pecking order
theory, which argues that companies prefer to optimize
internal funding from retained earnings as this would
make external financing unnecessary.
The results of the hypothesis testing, which uses a
random effect method for COD dependent variable, indicate that FAMOWN independent variable has a probability value of 0.0000, which is significant at the 1%, 5%,
or 10% level of trust. The other significant variables are
LEV and PERF, whose probability value is also 0.0000 at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level of trust. SIZE variable also falls
within the 1%, 5% and 10% categories of significance.
However its probability value is 0.0023 or 0.23%.
In the t-statistic above, the most significant variables
are FAMOWN, LEV, SIZE and PERF. The above table
indicates that: (1) every 1% increase in FAMOWN in a
company will cause a 0.0206 or 2.06% increase in cost

of debt (COD); (2) every 1% increase in a company’s
debt level (LEV) will cause a 0.0325 or 3.25% increase
in COD; (3) every 1-billion-rupiah increase in company
size (SIZE) will cause a 0.0080 or 0.8% increase in COD;
(4) every 1-unit decrease in company performance value
(PERF) will cause a 0.0926 or 9.26% increase in COD.
Table 3 shows the results of the second hypothesis
testing, which apparently are not satisfying. The second
hypothesis testing does not yield any confirming results
as the CEO variable has no significance to the high
probability value, which is 0.9158.
The significant variables at significance level of 1%,
5% or 10% are FAMOWN, LEV and PERF, of which
probability values are 0.0003, 0.0000 and 0.0000 respectively. SIZE variable also belongs to significance levels
1%, 5% and 10%, but with a slightly bigger probability
value, which is 0.0038 or 0.38%. Given this treatment,
the R-Square, Adjusted R-Square and Durbin-Watson stat
values remain unchanged. Thus, in the first model of this
study, all the variables belong to the ‘significant’ category,
except for CEO. FAMOWN, LEV, and SIZE variables
have positive impacts on cost of debt, and PERF has a
negative impact on cost on debt.
In the t-statistic above, the significant variables in the
first model are FAMOWN, LEV, SIZE and PERF. The
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Table 3. Results of Hypothesis Testing 2
Independent Variable

COD Dependent Variable
Coefficient

t-statistic

Probability

CEO

0.0004

0.1059

0.9158

FAMOWN

0.0203

3.6938

0.0003

LEV

0.0326

5.3255

0.0000

SIZE

0.0080

2.9330

0.0038

PERF

-0.0922

-4.4455

0.0000

Intercept

-0.0529

-1.7768

0.0772

Overall R-Square

0.1903

Adjusted R-Square

0.1686

Durbin-Watson stat

2.1794

table indicates that: (1) every 1% increase in FAMOWN
will increase COD by 0.0203 or 2.03%; (2) every 1%
increase in LEV will increase COD by 0.0326 or 3.26%;
(3) every 1-billion-rupiah increase in company SIZE
will increase COD by 0.0080 or 0.8%; (4) every 1-unit
decrease in company performance value will increase
COD by 0.0922 or 9.22%.
Then, an F-test is carried out to find out whether all
the independent and control variables, i.e. family ownership (FAMOWN), founding CEO or chairman (CEO),
level of debt (LEV), company size (SIZE), and performance (PERF), altogether affect the value of COD as the
dependent variable in this research. F-test results show that
FAMOWN, CEO, LEV, SIZE and PERF can altogether
significantly affect COD, as is evident from the F significance value, which is >0.05, or 0.0950 to be exact. Thus,
it can be concluded that H0 is not rejected.
The explanation above indicates that family ownership proportion has a significant positive impact, while
founding CEO does not have any significant impact
on cost of debt. The test conducted yields results that
are consistent with the hypotheses. Family ownership
proportion and owning CEO or chairperson has a positive
impact on COD. This is, however, contrary to a study by
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2000), which finds that family
ownership does not have any significant impact on COD.
Another study in Indonesia by Maydeliana (2008) also
confirms that family ownership has a positive impact,
though with a low level of significance.
Generally, when shareholders have a total combined
ownership of over 50%, they will have a significant
control power over a company. It can thus be assumed that
the bigger family ownership proportion is, the bigger the
control power becomes and the more significantly it can
affect cost of debt. Yet, if shareholders are concentrated
in several circles, it is difficult for a group to reach an
ownership proportion of up to 50%. If this is the case, the

control over a company will no longer related to the 50%
proportion above. Therefore, although family ownership
proportion is below 50%, the proportion can sufficiently
affect the course of the company’s future.
If a family-owned company has a large amount of debt,
the policies and decisions that the management makes
with regard to the company’s continuity will be significantly affected by the creditor’s terms and conditions.
For a creditor always requires a company in debt to meet
certain financial ratios. Therefore, in this case, control and
policy power does not lie solely in the hand of the majority
shareholders, but also in the hand of a creditor. Company
performance is monitored not only by the shareholders
but also by a creditor. If a company proposes for another
loan from the same or even a different creditor, its performance can affect the creditor’s perspective.
Due to the limited data available, the research does not
delve further into the involvement of the owning family in
the management and in the board of commissioners. Many
family-owned companies employ non-family executives
in the board of directors or commissioners. Therefore,
decisions regarding the continuity of a company are not
made exclusively by owning family members.
Eventually, company performance is determined not
only by family control or ownership proportion. A study
by Demzet and Villangola (2004) finds that companies
that employ non-family executives tend to show better
performance than do family-run companies. This claim
is also corroborated by Anderson and Reeb (2003) who
claim that family-owned companies that hire external
people will have lower costs of debt than do family-run
companies. So, large family ownership proportion does
not guarantee higher costs of debts. Since the limited
data do not enable the research to investigate family
members who are involved in the board of management
or commissaries, the research cannot provide adequate
elaboration on the implementation of corporate gover-
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nance in companies and its implication on the amount
of costs of debt.
According to a study by Anderson and Reeb (2003)
leadership by a founding CEO can reduce a company’s
cost of debt. Yet, this research finds no significant correlation between leadership by a founding CEO or chair
person and cost of debt. Founding CEO or chairperson
does not significantly affect cost of debt. This is possible
because in improving company performance and reduce
cost of debt, a CEO or chairperson must also be supported
and assisted by competent board of directors, board of
commissioners, and managers. (Ayub, 2008; Ikhwan,
2009).
The results of this research do not agree with a study by
Schmid et al. (2008), which concludes that family-owned
companies generally have better performance levels
compared to other companies, particularly those with a
founder effect, i.e. companies whose CEOs are actually
their founders. The latter study has its own background.
First, the initial incentives are derived from long-term
business commitment that aims at business continuity.
Second, the business investment portfolios are not diversified. Third, the existence of company founders leads
companies to reduce agency conflicts between creditors
and shareholders, which can consequently reduce costs of
debt. Actually the three backgrounds are also relevant for
the present research. However, in a developing country
like Indonesia, there seem to be many other external
factors that affect costs of debt and these factors are not
indentified further in this research (Ayub, 2008). Thus,
the results of the above research by Schmid et al. (2008)
in Germany cannot be adopted in a research conducted
in Indonesia. The study by Schmid et al. (2008), which
places an emphasis on business segmentation in familyowned companies, seems to constitute a specific analysis
in this study because the study reveals segmentation
levels that are lower than those in family-owned companies, which also causes costs of debt to reduce.
In Indonesia, many well-developed family-owned
companies have more than one segment. For example,
some telecommunication companies also have subsidiaries
in the property business. This practice is made possible
by partnership among such companies (Ikhwan, 2009).
Therefore the aspect of family-owned company segmentation cannot be elaborated further in this research although
it needs to be considered in follow-up researches.
Company size is a significant control variable. In this
research, company size is measured based on the total
asset value. Results suggest that asset value correlates
positively with cost of debt. In other words, the bigger
the company’s assets, the bigger the costs of debt. This,
however, differs from a study by Lee and Choi (2002),
which, as quoted in Siregar and Utama (2008), argues
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that company size is used as the proxy for the asymmetrical information on information disclosure and that,
unlike smaller companies, bigger companies are more
transparent in disclosing company-related information.
Therefore, creditors are more confident to give loans to
big companies that to small ones. Creditors consider that
less transparent information disclosure means greater
risks for them. As a result, creditors charge higher costs of
debts to small companies. However, as apparent from the
results, the company size proxy used to determine costs
of debt is ineffective since asymmetry of information is a
big problem in Indonesia.
Level of debt has positive and significant correlation.
The higher the level of debt, the higher cost of debt and
the higher the level of debt, the bigger the risks. Big
rises are related to the possibility that a company cannot
repay its debt because investment return turns to be lower
than that expected by the creditor. Debt level, which is
a substantial part of capital structure in a family-owned
company, cannot be ignored, as revealed in a study by
Ampenberger et al. (2009), which has a particular focus
on how capital structure affects cost of debt. The research
finds the “capital structure puzzle” scheme that results
from the institutional differences between family-owned
and non-family-owned companies. By considering
three different components of a family-owned company
(ownership, board of commissioners’ activities, and
management leadership by family member), it can be
seen that debt level (leverage) is lowest if the bulk of the
shares are family-owned and the company CEO is still a
family member. Thus, the results of both this study and
that undertaken by Ampenberger et al. (2009) indicate
that family-owned companies have a lower tendency to
use debt. As illustrated by the descriptive statistics, the
average costs of debt among family-owned companies are
still below the Bank of Indonesia rate of interest. Therefore, the costs of debt in the capital structure of familyowned companies are proportionally not high (Ampenberger et al., 2009).
Company performance has a negatively significant
correlation. The higher the performance, the lower the
costs of debt. It is believed that high performance gives
creditors better certainty that companies can repay their
debt. Family-owned companies in Indonesia do not
normally have the same operational age. In other words,
the different cycles existing in the different companies
cause performance measurements and analyses to vary.
This has actually been anticipated by Wiwattanakantang (2008), who argues that in their development, most
companies in developing countries are controlled by individuals, their family and partners. This condition is also
common in Indonesia as a developing country.
Most family-owned companies are initially closed
companies that finance their business activities by using
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internal and external funding. Such companies normally
have low to middle performance level. However, in line
with the economic and capital market development, many
of such family-owned companies have become opened
companies. Because of this, company performance now
has a negatively significant correlation with costs of debt,
suggesting that most family-owned companies are now
categorized as publicly listed companies with a mature
business cycle. With their current statues as open companies, the risks and profits which have initially been shared
among the founding family are now shared with external
parties. Thus, not only do these open companies share
risks with external parties, but they also have wider access
to more funding for their business expansion (Wiwattanakantang, 2000).
CONCLUSION
The series of tests on the impact of family ownership, CEO or chairman on cost of debt, which involves
64 sample family-owned companies that are sampled by
using the purposive sampling method, yield the following
results. First, family ownership proportion has a significant correlation with cost of debt, which is consistent
with the hypothesis. This finding indicates at least two
important things. (1) Consistent with the trade-off theory,
compared to other types of companies, family-owned
companies prefer larger debt-based funding sources. (2)
In imposing costs of debt to a company, a creditor takes
into account family ownership proportion. The proportion of family ownership reflects the risks of a company
and affects the creditor’s decision regarding the amount
of costs of debt it should charge a company. Second, test
results also show that leadership by a founding CEO or
chairperson does not have significant correlation with
costs of debt. A CEO or chairman, whose duty is to lead
and control a company, is not a crucial factor that determines the success of the company. A CEO or chairperson
must be supported by competent people who can improve
company performance. Creditors do not generally
consider a founding CEO or chairperson as a factor that
can reduce the risks they face and, in calculating costs of
debt, creditors to not take CEO or chairperson factor into
consideration.
This research can be used as a reference for investors.
The research advises investors to be more careful when
they choose to invest in companies with high concentration of family ownership. They should bear in mind
that highly concentrated companies can bear higher debt
levels risks than do diversified family-owned companies.
Like other similar researches, this research also has its
limitation. Considering the limited variables involved in
this research, further researches are advised to incorporate more variables so that the impact of family owner-
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ship on cost of debt can be better explained.
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